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THE SINGLE CONTRACT AS MINIMUM CONTACTS:
JUSTICE BRENNAN "HAS IT HIS WAY"
PAMELA J. STEPHENS*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past ten years the Supreme Court has made major
changes in its approach to personal jurisdiction." The Court has
forged two independently developed lines of cases into one stan-
dard 2 that depends upon International Shoe Co. v. Washington.-
It has addressed personal jurisdiction concerns in the contexts of a
single serious tort,4 a child custody dispute,5 personal injury liabil-
ity insurance,6 and a first amendment challenge.7 Until 1985, how-
ever, the Court had failed, even when presented with the opportu-
nity, to address personal jurisdiction limitations when a
nonresident's contact with the forum state consists of a single con-
tract rather than ongoing business activities.'
Unaided by the Supreme Court, lower federal and state courts
have grappled with this issue and have reached widely varying re-
sults, supported by widely varying assumptions about the Supreme
Court's current posture.' Those results range from a willingness to
assert jurisdiction based solely on the existence of a contract be-
* Associate Professor, Vermont Law School; B.A., 1977, Ohio State University; J.D., 1975,
University of Cincinnati.
1. For a general discussion of the Supreme Court's changes, see Jay, "Minimum Con-
tacts" as a Unified Theory of Personal Jurisdiction: A Reappraisal, 59 N.C.L. REV. 429
(1981); Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33 (1978).
2. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
3. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
4. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
5. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
6. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
7. Keeton y. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783
(1984).
8. See Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 445 U.S. 907, 909-10
(1980) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
9. See id. (Justice White cited several examples); Note, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Com-
mercial Litigation: When is a Contract a Contact?, 61 B.U.L. REv. 375 (1981).
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tween a resident and nonresident'0 to examinations not only of the
contract itself, but also its surrounding circumstances. Courts have
considered the relative bargaining power of the parties1 and the
nonresident's status as either the buyer or seller 2 or as the "pas-
sive" or "aggressive" party to the contract.' s The assumptions
range from an emphasis on sovereignty concerns and the purpose-
fulness of the defendant's contacts with the forum state 4 to em-
phasis on reasonableness, fairness, inconvenience to the defendant,
and the forum's interest in the litigation.' 5
In Burger King Corporation v. Rudzewicz, s the Supreme Court
finally focused directly on the single contract issue and purported
to establish a general standard for the assertion of personal juris-
diction in such cases.' 7
10. See, e.g., Mouzavires v. Baxter, 434 A.2d 988 (D.C. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1006
(1982).
11. See, e.g., Whittaker Corp. v. United Aircraft Corp., 482 F.2d 1079 (1st Cir. 1973).
12. Leoni v. Wells, 264 N.W.2d 646 (Minn. 1978). The court said, "However, our cases
have delineated a sharp distinction between nonresident sellers and nonresident buyers.
With respect to the latter, an isolated purchase of goods from a Minnesota seller will not by
itself subject the buyer to the jurisdiction of Minnesota courts." Id. at 647.
13. See, e.g., Republic Int'l Corp. v. Amco Eng'rs, Inc., 516 F.2d 161 (9th Cir. 1975).
14. Cases imposing relatively high standards for the assertion of personal jurisdiction
tend to rely on the Supreme Court's decision in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), and
cases that follow Hanson's defendant-oriented approach. See, e.g., Vencedor Mfg. Co. v.
Gaugler Indus., Inc., 557 F.2d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1977) (Chief Judge Coffin stated, "There is
no doubt that Hanson reduces the potential sweep of McGee. ... ); Anderson v. Shiflett,
435 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1971) (After Hanson, a single contract by a defendant for plaintiff's
unilateral performance of contracted personal service in the forum cannot support in per-
sonam jurisdiction.); Southern Machine Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 381-82
(6th Cir. 1968) (holding the purposeful availment requirement of Hanson to be the sine qua
non for in personam jurisdiction).
15. Courts permitting jurisdiction on a lesser showing of contacts frequently rely upon
McGee and its broad language regarding the fairness or reasonableness of asserting jurisdic-
tion over a defendant who entered into a contract having a significant connection with the
forum state. Some recent cases do not even cite World-Wide Volkswagen or its rigid two-
tiered approach. See Gold Kist Inc. v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 623 F.2d 375 (5th Cir.
1980); Pedi Bares, Inc. v. P & C Food Mkts., Inc., 567 F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1977); In-Flight
Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1972); see also Southwest Off-
set, Inc. v. Hudco Publishing Co., 622 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1980); Empress Int'l, Ltd. v. River-
side Seafoods, Inc., 112 Ill. App. 3d 149, 445 N.E.2d 371 (1983).
16. 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985).
17. Id. at 2185. "At the outset, we note a continued division among lower courts respect-
ing whether and to what extent a contract can constitute a 'contact' for purposes of due
process analysis." Id.
SINGLE CONTRACTS AS MINIMUM CONTACTS
This Article reviews the Supreme Court's post-International
Shoe decisions to determine what, if any, guidelines the Court had
given for personal jurisdiction in single contract cases prior to the
Burger King case. It also examines lower federal court and state
court decisions to establish the range of factual situations
presented and the ways courts have dealt with them. The Article
highlights the distinction drawn in the cases between specific and
general jurisdiction. It also considers in detail the Supreme Court's
decision in Burger King and its application to future single con-
tract cases. Lastly, the Article focuses on how Burger King affects
the law of personal jurisdiction as a whole, suggesting that, per-
haps in spite of itself, the Court is moving away from sovereignty
as the basis for due process concerns in the area and toward a mul-
tifactored analysis. Such an analysis considers not only the nonres-
ident's right to a fair and convenient forum, but also the plaintiff's
interest in bringing the case in a particular forum and the forum's
interest in retaining jurisdiction. The Article also addresses impli-
cations for commercial transactions and the increased certainty of
jurisdictional consequences.
II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN CONTRACT CASES
A. The Supreme Court
Since its 1945 decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton,18 the Court has struggled with its interpretation of the "mini-
mum contacts" test. The test, as stated in International Shoe, had
fairness and reasonableness as its ends, with a consideration of the
defendant's contacts with the forum as a means to those ends.1 9
The Court's earliest interpretation of the International Shoe test
was consistent with that approach. McGee v. International Life
Insurance Co.,20 a 1957 case, involved a single contract between a
California resident and a Texas insurance company. The Court,
upon a showing of very slight contacts, found it reasonable for Cal-
ifornia to assert jurisdiction over the Texas insurance company,
18. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
19. Id. at 316-17.
20. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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which maintained no offices, no sales staff, and otherwise did no
continuous business in California.2
In McGee, the Court stressed the forum's strong interest in pro-
tecting its citizens (which California had manifested in its statute
authorizing service of process on nonresident insurance compa-
nies)22 and the plaintiff's interest in having the case heard in a
convenient forum where he was likely to find key witnesses.23 The
conclusion that the defendant would experience little inconve-
nience also was relevant to the Court's analysis.24
Shortly after McGee, however, both the Supreme Court's view of
the underlying purposes of the due process restrictions on personal
jurisdiction and the test itself underwent a major shift in empha-
sis, if not in doctrine. This shift called into question the continued
validity in McGee's holding that a single contract satisfied the
minimum contacts test.25
Between Hanson v. Denckla28 in 1958 and the cases decided by
the Court in 1980, it became increasingly clear that the Court
viewed its International Shoe standard as a two-step analysis. In
fact, in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,27 the Court
not only articulated this two-step process, but also stated the ratio-
nales underlying each stage.28 The Court stated that any personal
jurisdiction determination must first consider whether a nonresi-
dent defendant had minimum contacts such that he or she "pur-
posefully availed" him or herself of the benefits and protections of
the forum state.29 To the extent that a defendant could reasonably
21. Id. at 221-23.
22. Id. at 221.
23. Id. at 223.
24. Id. at 224.
25. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
26. In Hanson, the Court refused to allow Florida to assert jurisdiction over a Delaware
trustee whose sole contact with Florida was that the deceased creator of the Delaware trust
moved to Florida and exercised a power of appointment over the trust while in Florida. Id.
at 238, 251-52. The Court rejected the contention that, as the "center of gravity" of the
dispute between the deceased's relatives, Florida was a fair and reasonable forum. Id. at
254. Instead, the Court emphasized that no state may assert jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant unless that nonresident has "purposefully availed" him or herself of the "benefits
and protections" of the forum state. Id. at 253.
27. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
28. Id. at 291-92.
29. Id. at 297.
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foresee being "haled into court" in the forum state, that foresee-
ability is evidence of purposeful availmentY' If such minimum con-
tacts are present, then and only then should the reasonableness
and fairness of the forum's assertion of jurisdiction be consid-
ered.3 1 In making this latter determination, the interests of the fo-
rum and the plaintiff, as well as the potential burden on the de-
fendant, are relevant.3 2
According to the Court in World-Wide Volkswagen, two func-
tions underlie the minimum contacts analysis outlined above: "It
protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a dis-
tant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States,
through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed
on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal sys-
tem."33 Only the first of these functions, reduced to secondary im-
portance under the Court's "contacts as threshold requirement"
analysis, may easily be conceptualized in terms of traditional due
process doctrines.3 4
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in World-Wide Volk-
swagen and Rush v. Savchuk criticized the majority's approach for
focusing too "tightly" upon the existence of contacts between the
defendant and the forum.3 5 "In so doing," he contended, "they ac-
cord too little weight to the strength of the forum State's interest
in the case and fail to explore whether there would be any actual
inconvenience to the defendant."3 " The Court's approach thus
failed to focus upon the "essential inquiry" of International Shoe,
the question of "fair play and substantial justice. 37
30. Id.
31. Id. at 294.
32. Id. at 292.
33. Id.
34. For an excellent discussion of the flaws in the Court's due process analysis, see Red-
ish, Due Process, Federalism and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw.
U.L. REv. 1112 (1981). Professor Redish stated, "One may wonder why a state lacking any
interest in a controversy should be allowed to assert jurisdiction over it. But under our
constitutional system, the inquiry is not why should a state be allowed to take an action,
but why shouldn't a state be allowed to do so." Id. at 1134.
35. 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 299-300.
37. Id. at 300.
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Instead of the majority approach, Brennan suggested an ap-
proach that would find jurisdictional requirements satisfied when
"the forum State has an interest in permitting the litigation to go
forward, the litigation is connected to the forum, the defendant is
linked to the forum, and the burden of defending is not unreasona-
ble."'8 Brennan's view rejected the majority's defendant focus,
which, he maintained, was inherited from Pennoyer v. Neff9 and
was based upon a model of society that is no longer accurate.40
Subsequently, the Court seemed to acknowledge that its reliance
on notions of sovereignty and federalism in World-Wide Volk-
swagen may have been overstated, if not wrong. In Insurance
Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee,4' the
Court stated:
The restriction on state sovereign power described in World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp., however, must be seen as ultimately a
function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due
Process Clause. That Clause is the only source of the personal
jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself makes no mention
of federalism concerns.42
Between McGee and Burger King, the Court did not address di-
rectly the issue of personal jurisdiction based on a single contract
rather than on a single serious tort or a pattern of continuous busi-
ness activity.43 The Court's failure to do so when given the oppor-
tunity prompted Justice White to dissent to the denial of certiorari
in one such case:
The question at issue is one of considerable importance to con-
tractual dealings between purchasers and sellers located in dif-
ferent States. The disarray among federal and state courts noted
above may well have a disruptive effect on commercial relations
in which certainty of result is a prime objective. That disarray
38. Id. at 302.
39. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
40. 444 U.S. at 308-09.
41. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
42. Id. at 703 n.10.
43. See Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 445 U.S. 907, 909-10
(1980) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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also strongly suggests that prior decisions of this Court offer no
clear guidance on the question.44
B. Disarray in the Lower Courts
As Justice White's dissent in Lakeside Bridge and Steel Co. sug-
gested, the lower federal and state court decisions regarding asser-
tions of personal jurisdiction in contract cases evidence a great
deal of confusion and disagreement.4 5 The major source of confu-
sion appears to be uncertainty concerning the continued viability
of the McGee case. Those courts that treat McGee as evidencing a
distinct rule for contract cases, a rule requiring a lesser showing of
contacts, are much more willing to find personal jurisdiction based
upon very slight contacts surrounding a single contract." Those
courts that appear to view McGee as an aberration or a precedent
whose value has been diminished by subsequent case law tend to
look for more contacts.47 It may be most helpful to examine these
lower federal and state cases in terms of the principal focus of each
court, noting that the range of approaches forms a continuum of
lesser to greater contacts, not distinct categories.
1. The Single Contract Alone as Minimum Contacts
Although generally criticized and not widely followed, some
cases hold that a nonresident who entered into a contract with a
resident of the forum automatically subjected him or herself to the
personal jurisdiction of the forum's courts.4 For example, in Pedi
44. Id.
45. For general discussions of these lower federal and state court cases prior to the Su-
preme Court's decision in Burger King, see Goodman, Minimum Contacts and Contracts:
The Breached Relationship, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1639 (1983); Note, Minimum Contacts
in Contract Cases: A Forward Looking Reevaluation, 58 NOTRE DAME LAW. 635 (1983);
Note, supra note 9.
46. See, e.g., Gold Kist Inc. v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 623 F.2d 375 (5th Cir.
1980); Pedi Bares, Inc. v. P & C Food Mkts., Inc., 567 F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1977); Product
Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974); In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van
Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1972).
47. See, e.g., Vencedor Mfg. Co. v. Gougler Indus., Inc., 557 F.2d 886 (1st Cir. 1977);
Anderson v. Shiflett, 435 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1971); Southern Machine Co. v. Mohasco
Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1968).
48. See, e.g., Southwest Offset, Inc. v. Hudco Publishing Co., 622 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1980);
Pedi Bares, Inc. v. P & C Food Mkts., Inc., 567 F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1977); Mouzavires v.
1986]
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Bares, Inc. v. P & C Food Markets, Inc.,49 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit interpreted the Kansas long-arm
statute to allow jurisdiction over a nonresident who signed a con-
tract with a resident.50 The court upheld the statute even though it
was the resident plaintiff who solicited the sale to the nonresident
defendant."1
2. Cases That Focus on Characterization of the Parties
Several cases focus upon the parties and their relationship to
each other. In some cases, the determining factor appears to be
whether the nonresident defendant was a buyer or a seller.52 In
other cases, the court's focus is on whether a party to the contract
is aggressive or passive.53 In buyer/seller cases, courts usually as-
sume the model of aggressive seller and passive buyer, and find
that a nonresident buyer's act of entering into a contract, without
more, falls short of establishing the level of purposeful availment
that would satisfy the minimum contacts test.5 4 In the aggressive/
passive cases, courts look beyond the labels of buyer and seller and
focus instead on the actual relationship between the parties and
Baxter, 434 A.2d 988 (D.C. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1006 (1982). But see Jadair, Inc. v.
Walt Keeler Co., 679 F.2d 131 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 944 (1982); Aaron Ferer &
Sons Co. v. American Compressed Steel Co., 564 F.2d 1206 (8th Cir. 1977). State statutes
allowing courts to base jurisdiction over a defendant on contacts arising out of a contract
with a resident of the forum usually require more contacts than the contractual obligation
before jurisdiction is allowed. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973); 4 TENN.
CODE ANN. § 20-2-214 (1980); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 801.05(5) (West 1977).
49. 567 F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1977).
50. Id. at 935.
51. Id. at 937.
52. See, e.g., Electro-Craft Corp. v. Maxwell Elec. Corp., 417 F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 1969);
McQuay, Inc. v. Samuel Schlosberg, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 902 (D. Minn. 1971); Rath Packing
Co. v. Intercontinental Meat Traders, Inc., 181 N.W.2d 184 (Iowa 1970); Fourth Northwest-
ern Nat'l Bank v. Hilson Indus., Inc., 264 Minn. 110, 117 N.W.2d 732 (1962); Darby v. Supe-
rior Supply Co., 224 Tenn. 540, 458 S.W.2d 423 (1970).
53. Republic Int'l Corp. v. Amco Eng'rs, Inc., 516 F.2d 161 (9th Cir. 1975); American
Continental Import Agency v. Superior Court, 216 Cal. App. 2d 317, 30 Cal. Rptr. 654
(1963); Compania De Astral, S.A. v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357 (1954).
54. See Fourth Northwestern Nat'l Bank v. Hilson Indus., Inc., 264 Minn. 110, -, 117
N.W. 2d 732, 735-36 (1962); see also Electro-Craft Corp. v. Maxwell Elec. Corp., 417 F.2d
365 (8th Cir. 1969). The reason for distinguishing buyers and sellers is "that a nonresident
seller subjects itself to the obligation of amenability to suit in return for the right to com-
pete for sales in the Minnesota market. Such reciprocity does not apply to the nonresident
buyer." Id. at 368.
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their activities in preparation for entering into the contract.5
Again', the purpose of such an inquiry is to determine whether the
nonresident defendant purposefully availed him or herself of the
benefits and protections of the forum.
3. Single-Contract-Plus Analysis
The vast majority of cases do not rely upon a single determina-
tive factor, but instead look to all the circumstances surrounding
the formation and performance of the single contract. These cases
reject the notion that the contract alone establishes sufficient mini-
mum contacts.56 In addition to the nature and relationship of the
parties, courts have considered the following contacts to be impor-
tant: communications into the state, both by mail and by phone;57
visits by a nonresident or, an agent for purposes of training or in-
spection;58 the expectation by the parties that performance (partic-
ularly in a manufacturing context) would occur in the forum
state;59 payments to be made to the plaintiff in the forum state;60
and choice of law provisions designating that the forum's law be
applied. 1 The case law does not reveal any pattern that will relia-
bly predict a finding of sufficient contacts.
55. See, e.g., Republic Int'l Corp. v. Amco Eng'rs, Inc., 516 F.2d 161 (9th Cir. 1975) (in-
volving an active buyer).
56. See, e.g., Electro-Craft Corp. v. Maxwell Elec. Corp., 417 F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 1969);
Agrashell, Inc. v. Bernard Sirotta Co., 344 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1965); Erlanger Mills, Inc. v.
Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956); Oswalt Indus., Inc. v. Gilmore, 297 F.
Supp. 307 (D. Kan. 1969).
57. See, e.g., Wisconsin Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Pennant Prods., Inc., 619 F.2d 676 (7th Cir.
1980); O'Hare Int'l Bank v. Hampton, 437 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1971); Electro-Craft Corp. v.
Maxwell Elec. Corp., 417 F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 1969).
58. Wisconsin Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Pennant Prods., Inc., 619 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1980); United
States Ry. Equip. Co. v. Port Huron & D.R.R., 495 F.2d 1127 (7th Cir. 1974); Whittaker
Corp. v. United Aircraft Corp., 482 F.2d 1079 (1st Cir. 1973).
59. Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974); In-Flight Devices
Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1972).
60. Burger King Corp. v. MacShara, 724 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985); United States
Ry. Equip. Co. v. Port Huron & D.R.R., 495 F.2d 1127 (7th Cir. 1974).
61. Republic Int'l Corp. v. Amco Eng'rs, Inc., 516 F.2d 161 (9th Cir. 1975); see, e.g.,
O'Hare Int'l Bank v. Hampton, 437 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1971). But c.f. Iowa Elec. Light &
Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 603 F.2d 1301, 1304 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 911
(1980); Galgay v. Bulletin Co., 504 F.2d 1062, 1066 (2d Cir. 1974).
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Given the generally accepted framework of the minimum con-
tacts analysis, courts usually purport to consider the "nature and
quality" of defendant's activities in the state.6 2 In reality, however,
the unfortunate consequence of this analysis has been a tendency
toward quantifying the contacts rather than an examination of the
quality of those contacts as International Shoe requires.6 3 One can
thus find cases with differing results in which the defendants en-
gaged in very similar activities. Consider, for example, two Seventh
Circuit decisions, Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State
Construction Co.6 4 and Wisconsin Electric Manufacturing Co. v.
Pennant Products, Inc.65 Personal jurisdiction was held proper in
the latter but not in the former. In both cases, the only contacts of
the nonresident defendants with the forum states were related to
the contract at issue in the case. According to the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, the difference in result was attributable to
visits to the forum by the defendant's agents in Wisconsin Elec-
tric. The court said, "The two visits by agents of the defendant to
Wisconsin are enough, in our opinion, to distinguish this case from
Lakeside."6 The court made no attempt to explain why those vis-
its sufficiently altered the defendant's relationship with the forum
so as to make it a fair place for trial. 7
These cases, as well as the cases in the preceding category, view
the Supreme Court's position as emphasizing the limits imposed
by territoriality and sovereignty concerns, and posit those concerns
62. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945):
It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line between
those activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and those
which do not, cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative .... Whether due
process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the
activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it
was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.
63. See, for instance, Whittaker Corp. v. United Aircraft Corp., 482 F.2d 1079, 1082 (1st
Cir. 1973), in which the court tallied up one defendant's contacts, five visits made by agents,
sixteen documents, and twenty teletype and telephonic messages sent into the forum, and
found those contacts sufficient to support personal jurisdiction. The court compared these
contacts with another defendant's contacts, three visits, seven documents and nine teletype
and telephonic messages, and held the latter defendant's contacts insufficient to support
personal jurisdiction. Id.
64. 597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 (1980).
65. 619 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1980).
66. Id. at 677.
67. Id. at 677-78.
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as preliminary to any consideration of fairness and reasonableness.
Even the courts that find personal jurisdiction apparently choose
to view Hanson and succeeding cases as limitations on the broad
jurisdictional reach of McGee.
4. Specific v. General Jurisdiction
"Claim relatedness" of contacts, in the sense of the claim arising
out of or being related to those activities that constitute a defend-
ant's contacts with the forum, has been part and parcel of the min-
imum-contacts analysis since International Shoe."' That notion
has been characterized by commentators, 9 and lately by the Su-
preme Court,70 as one of specific versus general jurisdiction. Spe-
cific jurisdiction applies to a claim that arises out of the defend-
ant's activities within the state. General jurisdiction may be
asserted when the claim does not arise out of the defendant's con-
tacts or activities in the state, but the defendant has engaged in
continuous and systematic activity within the state.71 Claim relat-
edness, therefore, impacts on the question of sufficiency of the de-
fendant's contacts; more and "better" contacts are required when
the claim is unrelated to those activities. 2
This issue has seldom been addressed directly by lower courts in
a contract setting. In Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales De Colom-
bia,73 the Texas Supreme Court found sufficient contacts with
68. In International Shoe, the court recognized that personal jurisdiction generally is al-
lowed "when the activities of the corporation there have not only been continuous and sys-
tematic, but also give rise to the liabilities sued on." 326 U.S. at 317.
69. See von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79
HARv. L. REv. 1121 (1966) (proposing specific and general jurisdiction as new terms and that
a new methodology should replace the traditional in personam, in rem, and quasi in rem
characterizations of jurisdiction).
70. Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984).
71. See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
72. According to the Court in Helicopteros, "[e]ven when the cause of action does not
arise out of or relate to the foreign corporation's activities in the forum State, due process is
not offended by a State's subjecting the corporation to its in personam jurisdiction when
there are sufficient contacts between the State and the foreign corporation." 466 U.S. at 414.
See also International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318. ("[T]here have been instances in which the
continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of such a
nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct
from those activities.").
73. 638 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1982), rev'd, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
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Texas to support jurisdiction in an action arising out of a helicop-
ter crash in Peru.74 The defendant's contacts related to a contract
for transportation services.75 The United States Supreme Court re-
versed on the ground that the lower court sought to assert general
jurisdiction, which required a greater showing of the defendant's
contacts with Texas than was present on those facts.76
The action in Helicopteros was a tort claim, with jurisdiction
based upon contract contacts.77 That case failed to establish crite-
ria for determining when, if ever, a single contract might serve as
the basis for general jurisdiction in such a tort case. Nor did the
case resolve the extent to which a single contract and surrounding
circumstances would support an unrelated contract claim. The
question is whether general jurisdiction and the long-arm statutes
that provide for such jurisdiction are appropriate bases for juris-
diction in contract cases.
5. Forum Selection Clauses
Contract cases obviously differ from tort cases in that the parties
may anticipate and provide for a forum in which any disputes be-
tween them may be resolved.78 In The Bremen v. Zapata Off-
Shore Co., 79 the Supreme Court approved forum selection contract
clauses unless the party objecting to the clause can meet the heavy
74. Id. at 872.
75. Id. at 871. The plaintiffs were survivors of four United States citizens killed in a heli-
copter crash in Peru while working in that country constrqcting a pipeline. Helicol, the de-
fendant, owned and operated the helicopter. The defendant's contacts with Texas were as
follows: The defendant was contacted by one of the principals in the pipeline deal, a joint
venture based in Houston, Texas, and asked to supply transportation for the project. In
response, Helicol sent its general manager to Texas for negotiations. After reaching agree-
ment on all terms, the parties finally executed the contract in Peru. Helicol did not main-
tain an office in Texas, had no designated agent for service of process in Texas, was not
authorized to do business in Texas, performed no helicopter operations in Texas, and re-
cruited no employees in Texas. Id.
76. 466 U.S. at 416.
77. Defendant's contacts with Texas consisted of sending its chief executive officer to
Houston to negotiate the contract with the consortium involved; accepting into its New
York bank account checks drawn by the consortium on a Texas bank; purchasing helicop-
ters, equipment, and training sessions from a Texas manufacturer; and sending employees
to that manufacturer's facilities for training. The contract in the case was executed in Peru.
Id. at 410-12.
78. See Republic Int'l Corp. v. Amco Eng'rs, Inc., 516 F.2d 161, 168-69 (9th Cir. 1975).
79. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
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burden of showing that its enforcement would be unreasonable,
unfair, or unjust.8 0 Lower courts have applied that decision with-
out difficulty."'
Courts are more concerned about whether a choice of law provi-
sion in a contract should be given weight in determining if the de-
fendant has submitted him or herself to the forum's jurisdiction.2
If a consensus exists in the lower courts that have addressed this
question, it seems to be that the "choice of law provision cannot be
construed as a voluntary submission by [defendant] to the per-
sonal jurisdiction of the [forum] courts in the absence of any ex-
press contractual understanding to that effect."8
III. Burger King CASE
In 1978, Brian MacShara suggested to John Rudzewicz, the sen-
ior partner in a Detroit accounting firm, that they apply to Burger
King for a franchise in the Detroit area. MacShara proposed that
he serve as restaurant manager and that Rudzewicz supply the in-
vestment capital, with an even split of the profits. Rudzewicz
agreed and they filed a joint application for a franchise in Burger
King's Birmingham, Michigan, district office in the fall of 1978.8"
Burger King Corporation is a Florida corporation with its princi-
pal offices in Miami. The Rudzewicz-MacShara franchise applica-
tion was forwarded to the Miami headquarters, which entered into
a preliminary agreement with them in February 1979. Four months
of negotiation ensued, with disputes centering on site-development
fees, computation of monthly rent, and the assignment of the fran-
chisees' liabilities to a corporation they had formed. Rudzewicz
and MacShara negotiated with both the Birmingham district office
and the Miami headquarters. Eventually, they signed the final
agreements and commenced operations in an existing facility in
Drayton Plains, Michigan.85
80. Id. at 9-10, 12, 15.
81. See, e.g., Republic Int'l Corp. v. Amco Eng'rs, Inc., 516 F.2d 161 (9th Cir. 1975).
82. Id. at 168.
83. Agrashell, Inc. v. Bernard Sirotta Co., 344 F.2d 583, 588 (2d Cir. 1965).
84. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2179 (1985).
85. Id. at 2180. Under the final agreement, Rudzewicz obligated himself personally to
payments exceeding $1 million over the twenty-year franchise relationship. Id. at 2179.
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The store prospered during the summer of 1979, but during the
recession that fall business declined. Rudzewicz and MacShara
were unable to make their monthly payments to Miami as sched-
uled. Headquarters notified them that they were in default, and,
after negotiations between headquarters, the Birmingham office,
and the franchisees failed to solve the problems, headquarters ter-
minated the franchise and ordered Rudzewicz and MacShara to
vacate the premises. After they refused and continued to operate
as a Burger King, Burger King Corporation commenced a diversity
action in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida in 1981.8
Burger King Corporation conducts approximately eighty percent
of its business through franchises. It licenses franchisees to use its
trademarks and service marks for twenty years and leases the res-
taurant facility to them for the same term. The franchise system
also provides support and guidance in the form of market research,
advertising management, accounting, cost-control, and inventory-
control. Franchisees pay Burger King a $40,000 franchise fee and
commit themselves to pay monthly royalties, advertising and sales
promotion fees, and rent computed on the basis of gross sales. The
standard Burger King franchise agreement provides for oversight
by the corporation; it also provides that the relationship is estab-
lished in Miami and governed by Florida law, and it calls for all
payments and any relevant notices to be sent to the Miami head-
quarters. However, the ten district offices perform the day-to-day
monitoring of franchisees."7
Burger King's complaint against Rudzewicz and MacShara al-
leged that they had breached their franchise obligations "'within
[the jurisdiction of] this district court' by failing to make the re-
quired payments 'at plaintiffs place of business in Miami, Dade
County, Florida,' and also alleged tortious infringement of its
trademarks and service marks .. ."" The complaint sought dam-
ages, injunctive relief, and costs and attorney's fees. Defendants
86. Id. Burger King also invoked the court's federal question jurisdiction over federal
trademark disputes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). Id.
87. See id. at 2178-79 and the Court's conclusion that the district offices had "very little"
decision-making authority which necessitated direct negotiations with the Miami headquar-
ters. Id. at 2179 n.7.
88. Id. at 2180.
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entered special appearances and argued that because they were
Michigan residents and because Burger King's claim did not arise
within the Southern District of Florida, the court lacked personal
jurisdiction over them.89
The district court denied defendants' motions to dismiss and in-
stead held that, pursuant to Florida's long-arm statute, "a non-res-
ident Burger King franchisee is subject to the personal jurisdiction
of this Court in actions arising out of its franchise agreements."9' 0
The district court relied upon Florida statutory language extending
jurisdiction to "[a]ny person, whether or not a citizen or resident
of this state," who inter alia "[b]reach[es] a contract in this state
by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed
in this state," as long as the cause of action arises from the alleged
breach.9 ' After the court denied their motions, Rudzewicz and
MacShara filed an answer and a counterclaim alleging that Burger
King had violated Michigan's Franchise Investment Law.92
The three-day bench trial ended with a judgment for Burger
King on both counts, a damage award of $228,875, and an order by
the court to "immediately close Burger King Restaurant Number
775 from continued operation or to immediately give the keys and
possession of said restaurant to Burger King Corporation. 9 3 The
district court also found that defendants failed to prove their
counterclaim and awarded costs and attorney's fees to plaintiff.9
Rudzewicz appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, which reversed the district court's judgment. 5 The court
of appeals noted that "the circumstances of the Drayton Plains
franchise and the negotiations which led to it left Rudzewicz bereft
of reasonable notice and financially unprepared for the prospect of
franchise litigation in Florida."' Therefore, the court continued,
89. Id. Defendants were served in Michigan pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4. Id. at 2180 n.10.
90. Id. at 2180.
91. Id. at 2177 (citing FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(g) (Supp. 1984)).
92. Id. at 2180.
93. Id.
94. Burger King Corp. v. MacShara, 724 F.2d 1505, 1508 (11th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985).
95. Id. at 1513.
96. Id.
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"[j]urisdiction under these circumstances would offend the funda-
mental fairness which is the touchstone of due process."97
Rudzewicz and Burger King agreed to a compromise under
which Rudzewicz waived his right to appeal the district court's
finding of trademark infringement and its entry of injunctive re-
liefY5 Thus, the Supreme Court was not asked to address the ex-
tent to which the tortious-act provisions of Florida's long-arm stat-
ute constitutionally could extend to out-of-state trademark
infringement, but rather was directed only to the question of that
statute's constitutionally permissible reach in a contract setting.99
The Supreme Court's opinion first reaffirmed the roots of its
current personal jurisdiction approach by citing International
Shoe's minimum-contacts test. The Court quoted the Interna-
tional Shoe provision that the "Due Process clause protects an in-
dividual's liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judg-
ments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful
'contacts, ties or relations'." 100 The Court also acknowledged once
again the specific versus general jurisdiction dichotomy that has
appeared in its recent cases. The requirement that individuals
have "fair warning that a particular activity may subject [them] to
the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign" is satisfied in the specific
jurisdiction context if the defendant has "'purposefully directed'
his activities at residents of the forum, . . . and the litigation re-
sults from alleged injuries that 'arise out of or relate to' those
activities." 10'
97. Id.
98. 105 S. Ct. at 2180 n.11. MacShara did not appeal his judgment. Id.
99. The Court initially declined to assume jurisdiction by appeal; instead, it granted peti-
tion for certiorari, holding that appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) is properly
invoked only where a court of appeals "squarely has 'held' that a state statute is unconstitu-
tional on its face or as applied; jurisdiction does not lie if the decision might rest on other
grounds." Id. at 2181 n.12 (original emphasis). The lower court here was unclear about the
basis of the decision. Id.
100. Id. at 2181-82 (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319). Interestingly, the Court
referred to its decision in Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03 n.10 (1982), to reemphasize that "[a]lthough this protection
operates to restrict state power, it 'must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual
liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause' rather than as a function 'of federal-
ism concerns.'" 105 S. Ct. at 2182 n.13.
101. Id. at 2182 (quoting Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 218; Keeton, 465 U.S. at 774; and
Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, 466 U.S. at 414).
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In addressing contract cases in particular, the Court noted that,
with respect to interstate contractual obligations, it had empha-
sized that "parties who 'reach out beyond one state and create con-
tinuing relationships and obligations with citizens of another state'
are subject to regulation and sanctions in the other state for the
consequences of their activities. ' 10 2 Rejecting the notion that juris-
diction may be avoided merely because the defendant did not
physically enter the forum state, the Court stated that "it is an
inescapable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial
amount of business is transacted solely by mail and wire communi-
cations across state lines, thus obviating the need for physical pres-
ence within a state in which business is conducted. 0 3 Under such
circumstances, the absence of physical contacts will not defeat per-
sonal jurisdiction as long as the defendant has purposefully di-
rected his or her activities toward the residents of another state.104
The Court continued to articulate its personal jurisdiction test in
terms of two steps: "Once it has been decided that a defendant
purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum
State, these contacts may be considered in light of other factors to
determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would
comport with 'fair play and substantial justice.' ,,105 Relevant to
the latter determination are "the burden on the defendant," "the
forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute," the "plaintiff's
interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief," "the inter-
state judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient reso-
lution of controversies," and the "shared interest of the several
states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies."'1 6
Applying these principles, the Court determined that the district
court correctly concluded that the assertion of jurisdiction over
Rudzewicz did not offend due process.10 7 That was so, the Court
102. 105 S. Ct. at 2182 (quoting Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 647
(1950)).
103. Id. at 2184.
104. See generally id. Interestingly, the Court spoke in terms of a "commercial actor's
efforts," id., suggesting as it did in Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 93 (1980), that
personal or family disputes will require a different, perhaps more stringent, standard for
assertions of personal jurisdiction.
105. 105 S. Ct. at 2184 (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320 (emphasis added)).
106. Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292).
107. Id. at 2185.
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concluded, not because an individual's contract with an out-of-
state party alone automatically can establish sufficient minimum
contacts in the other party's home forum, but rather because this
particular contract had a "substantial connection" with the state
of Florida. 08 The Court indicated that judges should ascertain the
nature of the connection by reference to "prior negotiations and
contemplated future consequences, along with the terms of the
contract and the parties' actual course of dealing."'109 All of these
factors "must be evaluated in determining whether the defendant
purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum." 0
Despite Rudzewicz's lack of physical ties to Florida"" (according
to the record he had never even visited the state) the Court found
that by "[e]schewing the option of operating an independent local
enterprise, Rudzewicz deliberately 'reach[ed] out beyond' Michi-
gan and negotiated with a Florida Corporation for the purpose of a
long-term franchise and the manifold benefits that would derive
from affiliation with a nationwide organization.""' 2 Moreover, the
Court stated that Rudzewicz's refusal to make payments as re-
quired by contract and his continued use of the Burger King trade-
marks and confidential business information after notice of termi-
nation "caused foreseeable injuries to the corporation in Florida.
For these reasons it was, at the very least, presumptively reasona-
108. Id. at 2186 (quoting McGee, 355 U.S. at 223) (emphasis in McGee). "If the question
is whether an individual's contract with an out-of-state party alone can automatically estab-
lish sufficient minimum contacts in the other party's home forum, we believe the answer
clearly is that it cannot." Id. at 2185 (original emphasis).
109. Id. at 2186.
110. Id.
111. MacShara attended a brief training course in Miami at Burger King University. The
court of appeals held that MacShara's presence in Florida was irrelevant to the question of
Rudzewicz's minimum contacts with that forum because the two signed contracts with Bur-
ger King in their individual capacities. 724 F.2d at 1513 n.14. The Supreme Court was not
sure whether that factor was determinative. The Court pointed out that the two franchisees
did form a corporation (with which Burger King refused to deal), that they were required to
decide which of them would attend the training sessions, and that the Court had previously
noted that commercial activities "'carried on in behalf of' an out-of-state party . . . may
sometimes be ascribed to the party." 105 S. Ct. at 2186 n.22 (quoting International Shoe,
326 U.S. at 320). The Court ultimately concluded, however, that MacShara's visit to Florida
was not "pivotal" to the disposition of this case and therefore that it need not define the
"permissible bounds of such attribution." Id. at 2186 n.22.
112. Id. at 2186 (quoting Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 647 (1950)).
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ble for Rudzewicz to be called to account there for such
injuries."'113
The court of appeals had concluded that, in light of his extensive
dealings with the Birmingham office, Rudzewicz had reason to be-
lieve that "the Michigan office was for all intents and purposes the
embodiment of Burger King.' 1 14 He therefore had no "reason to
anticipate a Burger King suit outside of Michigan."' 1 5 In rejecting
that conclusion, the Supreme Court noted that the contract docu-
ments themselves emphasized that the Miami office was Burger
King's headquarters, that Rudzewicz was required to send all rele-
vant notices and payments there, and that the agreements were
made in and enforced from Miami."1" In addition, the parties' in-
teractions while resolving disputes pre-contract and post-default
confirmed that the franchisees knew that the Miami office made
the key decisions." 7 Lastly, the Court placed particular weight on
provisions in the various franchise documents that provided that
all disputes would be governed by Florida law." s For example, one
document provided in pertinent part:
This Agreement shall become valid when executed and accepted
by BKC at Miami, Florida; it shall be deemed made and entered
into in the State of Florida and shall be governed and construed
under and in accordance with the laws of the State of Florida.
The choice of law designation does not require that all suits con-
cerning this agreement be filed in Florida.'19
113. Id. at 2186.
114. 724 F.2d at 1511.
115. Id.
116. 105 S. Ct. at 2186-87. "When problems arose over building design, site-development
fees, rent computation, and the defaulted payments, Rudzewicz and MacShara learned that
the Michigan office was powerless to resolve their disputes and could only channel their
communications to Miami. Throughout these disputes, the Miami headquarters and the
Michigan franchisees carried on a continuous course of direct communications by mail and
by telephone, and it was the Miami headquarters that made the key negotiating decisions
out of which the instant litigation arose." Id. at 2187.
117. Id. at 2186-87.
118. Id. at 2187.
119. Id. (quoting App. 72). The Court acknowledged that in Hanson v. Denckla, it stated
that "the center of gravity for choice-of-law purposes does not necessarily confer the sover-
eign prerogative to assert jurisdiction," but it denied that the language suggested that
choice-of-law provisions should be ignored in determining purposeful availment. Id. at 2187.
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The Court construed such contract language to support its notion
that defendant had "'purposefully availed himself of the benefits
and protections of Florida's laws' by entering into contracts ex-
pressly providing that those laws would govern franchise
disputes."12
Finally, the Court addressed the reasonableness of the district
court's assertion of jurisdiction and concluded that the defendant
had not "pointed to other factors that can be said persuasively to
outweigh the considerations discussed above and to establish the
unconstitutionality of Florida's assertion of jurisdiction. '12'
Justice Stevens, writing in dissent, found "a significant element
of unfairness" in requiring this franchisee to defend a case of this
kind in Florida:
It is undisputed that respondent maintained no place of busi-
ness in Florida, that he had no employees in that State and that
he was not licensed to do business there. Respondent did not
prepare his french fries, shakes, and hamburgers in Michigan,
and then deliver them into the stream of commerce "with the
expectation that they [would] be purchased by consumers in"
Florida .... To the contrary, respondent did business only in
Michigan, his business, property and payroll taxes were payable
in that state, and he sold all of his products there.122
The dissent found persuasive the majority opinion for the court of
appeals. Justice Stevens agreed that Rudzewicz dealt almost exclu-
sively with the Birmingham, Michigan, office, that the contract was
to be performed in the state of Michigan, and therefore that
Rudzewicz had no reason to anticipate a Burger King suit in Flor-
ida. "' Thus, the dissent concluded, the assertion of jurisdiction
would offend notions of fundamental fairness.2 4
120. Id. (quoting 724 F.2d at 1513 (Johnson, J., dissenting)).
121. Id. at 2187-88 (original emphasis).
122. Id. at 2190 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 2190-91. The circuit court stated, "Rudzewicz lacked fair notice that the dis-
tant corporate headquarters which insulated itself from direct dealings with him would later
seek to assert jurisdiction over him in the courts of its own home state." Id. (quoting 724
F.2d at 1511).
124. Id. at 2191. "The contracts contemplated the startup of a local Michigan restaurant
whose profits would derive solely from food sales made to customers in Drayton Plains. The
sale, which involved the use of an intangible trademark in Michigan and occupancy of a
[Vol. 2.8:89
SINGLE CONTRACTS AS MINIMUM CONTACTS
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF Burger King
A. For Contract Cases
Although the Court has left many questions unanswered, the
Burger King decision offers lower courts some guidance in deter-
mining the validity of assertions of personal jurisdiction in con-
tract cases. First, the Court rejected the notion that merely enter-
ing into a contract with a resident of the forum subjects a
nonresident to the jurisdiction of the forum.125 Those cases that
have interpreted single-act long-arm statutes in such a manner are
thus invalidated by the Court's decision. 126 Instead, the Court
adopted what is characterized as a "highly realistic" approach that
"recognizes that a 'contract' is 'ordinarily but an intermediate step
serving to tie up prior business negotiations with future conse-
quences which themselves are the real object of business
transactions.' ,'127
Courts, then, should consider prior negotiations and future con-
sequences surrounding a contract to determine whether the con-
tract has a "substantial connection" with the forum. It appears
that a nonresident defendant's participation in a contract that has
a substantial connection with the forum will be sufficient to satisfy
due process.1 28 As the Court acknowledged, such an approach pre-
cludes clear-cut jurisdictional rules.129 That seems contrary to the
Court's position in World-Wide Volkswagen that the due process
clause as manifested by the minimum-contacts test "gives a degree
of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defend-
ants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assur-
ance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable
to suit.' 3 0 Surely, commercial transactions offer a setting in which
predictability of consequence may be of paramount importance.
Yet the Court disposes of this concern by repeating the oft-quoted
)Burger King facility there, required no performance in the state of Florida." Id. (quoting
724 F.2d at 1511).
125. Id. at 4546.
126. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
127. 105 S. Ct. at 2185 (quoting Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 316
(1943)); see supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
128. 105 S. Ct. at 2186.
129. Id. at 2189 n.29.
130. 444 U.S. at 297.
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language that any inquiring into" 'fair play and substantial justice'
necessarily requires determinations 'in which few answers will be
written in black and white. The greys are dominant and even
among them the shades are innumerable.' """'
Perhaps the Court is less concerned with providing jurisdictional
certainty because in contract situations, particularly those in a
commercial context, the parties are free to determine the choice of
forum in advance. 132 The franchise agreement at issue in Burger
King did not include such a choice, but the tone of the Court's
discussion, in particular its discussion of the agreement's choice-of-
law provisions, seemed to hold the absence of such a forum selec-
tion against the defendant.133
The Court could reasonably have concluded that the absence of
such a clause in contracts drafted by Burger King Corporation and
containing several references to the use of Florida law indicated
that Burger King did not consider Florida either the obvious or
necessary forum choice. Surely, if all the parties, or Burger King
alone, intended a Florida forum, they could easily have included a
clause providing for it. One can argue, of course, that a court
should not infer expectations or intent from the failure to include
such a forum selection clause; its absence should be a neutral
factor.13 4
The Supreme Court, however, held that references to the use of
Florida law in the contract "standing alone would be insufficient to
confer jurisdiction," but "when combined with the 20-year interde-
pendent relationship Rudzewicz established with Burger King's
Miami headquarters, it reinforced his deliberate affiliation with the
forum State and the reasonable foreseeability of possible litigation
there."'1 5 Lower courts are left to determine which factors, in addi-
tion to choice-of-law boilerplate in a commercial contract, will be
sufficient to ascribe expectations to a nonresident who has not con-
sented explicitly in a contract to a particular forum.
131. 105 S. Ct. at 2189 n.29 (quoting Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. at 92).
132. See, e.g., id. at 2187-88 (Court's discussion of choice of law provisions).
133. Id.
134. See supra note 61.
135. 105 S. Ct. at 2187.
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Of continuing concern is the scenario raised by the court of ap-
peals in Burger King and underlying the buyer/seller cases. 136 The
court of appeals argued that allowing jurisdiction over the defend-
ants in Burger King would also allow the exercise of jurisdiction
over "out-of-state consumers to collect payments due on modest
personal purchases" and "sow the seeds of default judgments
against franchisees owing smaller debts. ' ' 137 One wonders whether
Sears, Roebuck and Company can gain jurisdiction in the northern
district of Illinois over its nonresident consumer buyers who have a
revolving charge account with the company and who contemplate a
long-term relationship with Sears, and whether Sears can
strengthen its case merely by including choice-of-law language in
its contractual agreements with such customers. The Court's an-
swer to this concern was only that it was not adopting a per se
rule, even for franchise cases, and that consideration of the "qual-
ity and nature" of a defendant's activities can include considera-
tions of possible "fraud, undue influence, or overreaching bargain-
ing power. '13 8
Perhaps most interesting for future personal jurisdiction deter-
minations in contracts cases, the Court appears'to have applied the
effects test in some form to the facts of this case. The Restatement
effects test grants jurisdiction to a state
over an individual who causes effects in the state by an act done
elsewhere with respect to any cause of action arising from these
effects unless the nature of the effects and of the individuals re-
lationship to the state make the exercise of such jurisdiction
unreasonable. 139
This test has had a checkered history in the Supreme Court. In
Kulko v. Superior Court, the Court rejected the test as inapplica-
ble to the facts of the case since it only "was intended to reach
wrongful activity outside of the State causing injury within the
State. 1 40 Although the California Supreme Court relied on the ef-
fects test to find jurisdiction over Kulko, the United States Su-
136. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
137. 724 F.2d at 1510, 1511.
138. 105 S. Ct. at 2189.
139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 (1971).
140. 436 U.S. at 96.
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preme Court's dismissal of the test was rather summary. Some
commentators concluded that the Court's rejection had implica-
tions beyond the noncommercial family law context of Kulko.'4'
In World-Wide Volkswagen,142 a case which certainly would
seem to trigger a discussion of the effects test, the Court did not
consider it, thus lending credibility to the suggestion that the
Court did not consider the effects test viable. The Court applied
the effects test, however, in two 1984 decisions, Calder v. Jones143
and Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,'44 both of which turned princi-
pally on the issue of whether the first amendment provided a sub-
stantive limitation on a court's exercise of personal jurisdiction in
a libel case. 145 It concluded that "[j]urisdiction over petitioners is
therefore proper in California based on the 'effects' of their Florida
conduct in California. ' 146 At least one commentator has suggested
that the Court's various approaches can be reconciled by limiting
the use of the effects test to cases involving intentional wrongful
conduct outside the forum, which causes an injury inside the fo-
rum.147 Heretofore, that intentional conduct has been tortious. 148
In Burger King, the Court never cited the effects test, but it did
cite Keeton for the proposition that the "fair warning" to the de-
fendant required by due process "is satisfied if defendant has 'pur-
posefully directed' his activities at residents of the forum. . . and
the litigation results from alleged injuries that 'arise out of or re-
late to' those activities."'' 49 Moreover, the Court cited the defend-
ant's failure to make required payments and his continued use of
141. See, e.g., McDermott, Personal Jurisdiction: The Hidden Agendas in The Supreme
Court Decisions, 10 VT. L. REv. 1 (1985).
142. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
143. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
144. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
145. For a discussion of the substantive legal issues surrounding the possible use of the
first amendment as a limitation on personal jurisdiction, see Comment, Minimum Contacts
and the First Amendment: When Should They Meet?, 35 BAYLOR L. REV. 467 (1983).
146. 465 U.S. at 789 (emphasis added).
147. See McDermott, supra note 141 at 45-46.
148. See, e.g., Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) (tortious out-of-state conduct resulting
in libel in forum state); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770 (1984) (same); World-
Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98 (endorsing the result in cases like Gray v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961)).
149. 105 S. Ct. at 2182 (quoting Keeton, 465 U.S. at 774, and Helicopteros Nacionales De
Colombia, 466 U.S. at 414).
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Burger King's trademarks and confidential business information
after termination as causing "foreseeable injuries to the corpora-
tion in Florida." 150 This resembles effects-test language: activity
outside the forum causing injury inside the forum.
This use of the effects test is of little consequence for contracts
cases, however. Contrary to statements in the literature, "effects"
seem to represent only another type of contact. The effects test is
not a substitute for the minimum-contacts test, but rather offers
another way of demonstrating such contacts and the fairness and
reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction over the absent defendant.
In single-contract cases, harmful effects are only one of the circum-
stances surrounding the making and breaking of the contract that
lead to litigation. Harmful effects supply the injury link, which al-
lows the assertion of specific jurisdiction. That the defendant's in-
tended actions had such foreseeable effects also may tend to rein-
force a finding of "foreseeability. . .that he [would be]. . . haled
into court" in that forum. 151
B. For Personal Jurisdiction Generally
In some ways, Burger King is a more interesting case for what it
implies about personal jurisdiction generally than for what it im-
plies about contract cases in particular. In the recent personal ju-
risdiction cases beginning with Shaffer v. Heitner,5 2 two trends
are apparent. First, the Court, attempting to articulate in a variety
of factual settings a unified theory for all assertions of personal
jurisdiction, has discarded, for the most part, labels such as in rem
and in personam and substituted "general" and "specific"
jurisdiction. 53
Second, the cases apparently reflect an intent to limit expanding
lower court interpretations of the minimum-contacts test. Hence,
there has been a renewed emphasis on state sovereignty as a limit
on assertions of personal jurisdiction. 54 This trend probably
150. Id. at 2186.
151. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
152. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
153. See Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15 (1984).
154. See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
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reached its peak in 1980 with World-Wide Volkswagen 155 and
Rush v. Savchuk.156 In those cases, the Court emphasized that, ab-
sent contacts by the defendant, no showing of the defendant's lack
of inconvenience or fairness to the plaintiff could serve to justify
jurisdiction. 157 The Court stated, "The framers . . . intended that
the States retain many essential attributes of sovereignty, includ-
ing, in particular, the sovereign power to try causes in their
courts.' 1 58 However, the due process clause "does not contemplate
that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against [a]
. . . defendant with which the State has no contacts, ties or
relations."'1 59
Justice Brennan's dissent to World-Wide Volkswagen and Rush
objected to the majority's bias in favor of the defendant contesting
jurisdiction. 60 He accused the Court of losing sight of the reason
for considering minimum contacts of a defendant, that is, to deter-
mine "whether the particular exercise of jurisdiction offends 'tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "161 Brennan
suggested that the minimum-contacts test may be outdated and
concluded that "constitutional concepts of fairness no longer .re-
quire the extreme concern for defendants that was once necessary.
Rather, . . . minimum contacts must exist among the parties, the
contested transaction, and the forum State. The contacts between
any two of these should not be determinative.' 6 2
In that context, it is significant that Justice Brennan wrote the
majority opinion in Burger King. Although couched in traditional
terminology and citing World- Wide Volkswagen throughout, 63 the
opinion reflected Brennan's previously expressed concerns and ar-
155. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
156. 444 U.S. 320 (1980). Rush held invalid the Seider rule developed in New York and
upheld by the Second Circuit. The rule stated that a contractual obligation of an insurance
company to its insured was a debt subject to attachment in asserting quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion. Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312 (1966).
157. Rush, 444 U.S. at 332.
158. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293.
159. Rush, 444 U.S. at 333 (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319).
160. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
161. 444 U.S. at 300 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at
316).
162. Id. at 309-10.
163. See, e.g., 105 S. Ct. at 2184, 2185, 2188 n.26.
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guably shifted the focus of the Court's attention from the defend-
ant toward a more multifactored analysis. This shift manifested it-
self in two ways. First, in the first stage of the analysis, the Court
appears to have shifted the focus from the defendant's actual con-
tacts with the forum to a consideration of the substantial connec-
tion of the franchise agreement itself with Florida 64 and the
"manifest interest" of the forum in providing its injured residents
with a convenient forum. 165 Second, Brennan echoed the conten-
tion in his dissent in World-Wide Volkswagen that a showing of
contacts creates a presumption of reasonableness that the defend-
ant must overcome in order to resist the forum's assertion of per-
sonal jurisdiction. 166
The majority opinion did not reject the two-stage analysis
spelled out by the Court in World-Wide Volkswagen, and in fact
affirmed that "the constitutional touchstone remains whether de-
fendant purposefully established 'minimum contacts' in the forum
State.'1 67 However, the Court's review of personal jurisdiction be-
gan with the statement that the "Due Process Clause protects an
individual's liberty interest in not being subject to the binding
judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful
'contacts, ties or relations.' "168 Next, the Court cited Insurance
Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnies Des Bauxites De Guinee,
seemingly moving away from the strong "federalism" emphasis of
World-Wide Volkswagen.169
In spite of the obligatory citations of World-Wide Volkswagen 7 °
and Hanson v. Denckla,'7 1 the application of law to the facts of the
case bears more resemblance to the analysis in McGee,' 2 a case
the Court obviously considers viable precedent,17 3 than to the anal-
ysis in later cases. Like the dispute in McGee, the Court said that
164. Id. at 2181-84.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 2183-85.
167. Id. at 2183.
168. Id. at 2181-82.
169. 456 U.S. 694, 702-03 n.10 (1982).
170. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
171. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
172. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
173. "Jurisdiction is proper, however, where the contacts proximately result from actions
by the defendant himself that create a 'substantial connection' with the forum State." 105
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this "franchise dispute grew directly out of 'a contract which had a
substantial connection with [the forum] state.' """ Looking at the
contract itself, the Court found that its choice-of-law provisions in-
dicated that Rudzewicz purposefully availed himself of the benefits
and protections of Florida law, even in the absence of physical con-
tacts.17 5 Consistent with his view in World-Wide Volkswagen,1 6
Justice Brennan appeared to evaluate the contacts in terms of
what they implied about the fairness of asserting jurisdiction over
the defendant. For example, rejecting the notion that Rudzewicz
was operating a local Michigan enterprise, Brennan says that
Rudzewicz "deliberately 'reached out beyond' Michigan and nego-
tiated with a Florida Corporation for the purchase of a long-term
franchise and the manifold benefits that would derive from affilia-
tion with a nationwide organization. ' 177 Implicit in that language is
the conclusion that the defendant was not the kind of local entre-
preneur over whom assertions of jurisdiction might be unfair, but
rather that he may fairly be held accountable in a Florida court.
The mixing of the fairness/reasonableness consideration and the
contacts/sovereignty analysis simply may reflect the fact that the
Court's attempt to separate these policies into two stages was un-
successful. However, the majority opinion implies something else.
In both the World-Wide Volkswagen dissent and the Burger King
opinion, Brennan suggested that a proper application of the mini-
mum-contacts test, one that looked to contacts "among the par-
ties, the contested transaction and the forum State,1 1 78 would cre-
ate a presumption of reasonableness. A defendant could overcome
this presumption only by showing "the presence of some other con-
siderations [that] would render jurisdiction unreasonable.' ' 7 9 Such
a showing, Brennan reasoned, would seldom rise to the level of a
constitutional concern. 180 Instead, the Court held, most such con-
S. Ct. at 2183-84 (original emphasis) (quoting McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S.
220, 223 (1957)).
174. 105 S. Ct. at 2186.
175. Id. at 2187.
176. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
177. 105 S. Ct. at 2186.
178. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 309-10 (emphasis added).
179. 105 S. Ct. at 2185.
180. Id.
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siderations could be accommodated by other means; for example,
"the potential clash of the forum's law with the 'fundamental sub-
stantive social policies' of another State may be accommodated
through application of the forum's choice-of-law rules," or "a de-
fendant claiming substantial inconvenience may seek a change of
venue."'
8SL
While considerations of the defendant's inconvenience would sel-
dom, in the Court's view, result in finding jurisdiction unconstitu-
tional, the Court did indicate that consideration of other interests
involved-the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute,
the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient relief, and the judi-
cial system's efficiency interest-may "serve to establish the rea-
sonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum con-
tacts than would otherwise be required." 8 2
Where does that leave personal jurisdiction analysis? To deem-
phasize the importance of the defendant's inconvenience, as the
majority opinion does, is consistent with Brennan's expressed de-
sire to move the analysis away from its pro-defendant stance. That
stance, as he pointed out, is a remnant of Pennoyer v. Neff,'83 a
throwback to the days when difficulty of travel and inadequacies of
communication may have made suing defendant in a faraway fo-
rum inherently unfair in many or even most cases. Assuming, as
the majority does, the continued viability of the minimum-contacts
test, Brennan appears to have moved the Court ever so slightly
toward a multifactored analysis, which considers contacts of all as-
pects of the litigation to the forum and the reasonableness of as-
serting jurisdiction based on those contacts. Such an analysis
would not overemphasize the tabulation and evaluation of defend-
ant's contacts with the forum. Instead, to the extent such contacts
form any threshold to personal jurisdiction, the threshold would be
an easy one to cross and the courts could then determine whether
subjecting defendants to suit in the forum is fair and reasonable.
The next logical step would be a recognition of the interrelation of
contacts and reasonableness, as the Court first suggested in Inter-
181. Id.
182. Id. at 2184.
183. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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national Shoe.18 4 Then the Court could eliminate the two-stage
analysis of World-Wide Volkswagen'85 with its threshold contacts
requirement and secondary consideration of fairness factors.
V. CONCLUSION
Burger King represents a shift in the Court's approach. It re-
mains to be seen whether McGee and Burger King represent only a
special approach for contract cases, justified perhaps by the nature
of contractual relationships and the potential for discerning par-
ties' intentions and expectations regarding personal jurisdiction
from their agreement. However, in making quite liberal use of the
whole range of personal jurisdiction cases since International
Shoe, it is suggested that the Court is speaking with relevance to
the personal jurisdiction doctrine in general.
And what it is saying is that the Court will take a less pro-de-
fendant stance, and, although the defendant's connection with the
forum state remains a prerequisite for jurisdiction, it is a prerequi-
site easily met. The result is an emphasis on the fairness and rea-
sonableness of the forum. Such fairness and reasonableness may
even, the Court suggests, overcome what might otherwise be con-
sidered a tenuous connection between the defendant and the
forum.
Such an analysis, with its emphasis on the interests of all the
parties, the forum, and the judicial system itself, would bring the
Court closer to the approach suggested forty years ago by the
Court in International Shoe, and would be in accord with princi-
ples traditionally associated with the due process clause.
184. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
185. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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